Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth: An Inquiry into Consciousness, Metaphysics and Epistemology

Andrew Gluck

Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth: An Inquiry into Consciousness, Metaphysics and Epistemology

The question of the relationship between mind and body as posed by Descartes, Spinoza, and others remains a fundamental debate for philosophers. In "Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth," Andrew Gluck constructs a pluralistic response to the work of neurologist Antonio Damasio. Gluck critiques the neutral monistic assertions found in "Descartes' Error "and "Looking for Spinoza" from a philosophical perspective, advocating an adaptive theory--physical monism in the natural sciences, dualism in the social sciences, and neutral monism in aesthetics. 2.5 out of 5 based on 1 reviews
Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth: An Inquiry into Consciousness, Metaphysics and Epistemology

Omniscore:

Classification Non-fiction
Genre Society, Politics & Philosophy, Psychology & Psychiatry
Format Paperback
Pages 100
RRP £9.00
Date of Publication July 2008
ISBN 978-1589661271
Publisher Chicago University Press
 

The question of the relationship between mind and body as posed by Descartes, Spinoza, and others remains a fundamental debate for philosophers. In "Damasio's Error and Descartes' Truth," Andrew Gluck constructs a pluralistic response to the work of neurologist Antonio Damasio. Gluck critiques the neutral monistic assertions found in "Descartes' Error "and "Looking for Spinoza" from a philosophical perspective, advocating an adaptive theory--physical monism in the natural sciences, dualism in the social sciences, and neutral monism in aesthetics.

Reviews

The Guardian

Steven Rose

Three hundred years ago, David Hume argued that one could not derive an ought from an is, but now we are being told that our "oughts" - our moral feelings - are indeed "ises", genetically and developmentally incarnated in our brains... Against these reductionist claims, the Jesuit philosopher Andrew Gluck attempts a spirited, but to my mind ultimately unsuccessful, rebuttal. His title makes reference to the neurologist Antonio Damasio, whose major book Descartes' Error and its succeeding volumes laid two charges against Cartesian philosophy. The first, the one that concerns Gluck, is Descartes's dualism, in which an immaterial soul interacts with a material brain through the pineal gland. Not so, says Damasio, and neuroscientists overwhelmingly agree: we are, and have to be, materialists. The world is made of one stuff, not two. Gluck demurs, accepting materialism for the physical sciences, idealism for the mind.

27/12/2008

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